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ABSTRACT
EXPECTATION HETEROGENEITY AND WEALTH INEQUALITY
FURKAN SARIKAYA
Economics M.A. Thesis, July 2019
Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Remzi Kaygusuz
Keywords: Wealth Inequality, Expectation Heterogeneity, Optimism, Pessimism,
Incomplete markets
This study examines the effect of expectation heterogeneity on wealth inequality
assuming that people with higher income are more optimistic about future returns
of their savings, through a modified version of Krusell - Smith heterogeneous agent’s
model with uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate uncertainty. Our main find-
ing is that wealth distribution is jointly determined by general equilibrium effect,
individual policy functions and income mobility under heterogeneous expectations
assumption. As a result, an inverse U-shape relation between wealth inequality and
level of expectation heterogeneity is observed.
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ÖZET
BEKLENTİLERİN HETEROJENLİĞİ VE SERVET EŞİTSİZLİĞİ
FURKAN SARIKAYA
Ekonmomi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2019
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Görevlisi Remzi Kaygusuz
Anahtar Kelimeler: Heterojen Beklentiler, Optimizm, Pesimizm, Servet Eşitsizliği,
Eksik Piyasalar
Bu çalışma insanların gelir seviyesi arttıkça yaptıkları birikimlerden bekledikleri
getirinin de arttığı varsayımına dayanarak heterojen beklentilerin servet eşitsizliği
üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda Krusell - Smith mod-
elinin sigorta edilmemiş bireysel risk ve makro belirsizlik mekanizmalarının birlikte
çalışabileceği bir versiyonu geliştirilip, yukarıdaki varsayım altında model simule
edilmiştir. Çalışmanın temel bulgusu bahsettiğimiz mekanizma altında servet eşit-
sizliğinin iki etki tarafından eş zamanlı olarak belirlendiğidir: Genel denge etkisi ve
bireysel karar fonksiyonu etkisi. Sonuç olarak, beklenti heterojenliğinin seviyesi ve
gelir eşitsizliği arasında ters U şeklinde bir ilişki gözlenmiştir.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing body of empirical literature that documents the expectation
heterogeneity among agents (see Branch (2004) and Hommes (2015)). Most of the
researches in this strand of literature focus on the question of where the expecta-
tion comes from and which model produces more consistent heterogeneous expec-
tations with the ones observed in the data (Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Ball,
Gregory Mankiw, and Reis (2005), Waters (2009)). In the theoretical literature, the
discussion on the sources of heterogeneity concentrates on three main approaches:
People have different expectations because (i) they are using different models, (ii)
they have different information sets, and (iii) the capacity to process information is
not the same for everyone.(Pfajfar (2013))
Leaving aside the vigorous debate on the source of expectation heterogeneity among
agents, it is generally conceded that people’s expectations about future inflation,
exchange rate, interest rates, and unemployment rate exhibit substantial variation,
leading significant macroeconomic implications. More recently, Das, Kuhnen, and
Nagel (2017) explore a further characteristic of this expectation heterogeneity, re-
vealing that individuals’ macroeconomic expectations are affected by their socioeco-
nomic status. To be more specific, their study infers that people with higher income
are more optimistic about the future return on their savings.
Our study is motivated by this empirical finding of Das, Kuhnen, and Nagel (2017)
and it examines the effect of future interest rate expectation heterogeneity on the
wealth distribution by assuming a positive relationship between individuals’ income
and their optimism about anticipated future interest rate on their assets. Due to
the absence of quantitative findings for the functional form or magnitude of the
expectation heterogeneity conditioned on the socioeconomic status individuals. 1,
a general model of heterogeneous expectation is developed, which are built upon
incomplete markets model with uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate uncer-
1Das, Kuhnen, and Nagel (2017) use the Michigan Surveys of Consumers(MSC), which individual are asked
to express their beliefs about future values of several macroeconomic variables. The survey questions are
far from being quantitative. Rather, they contain categorical answers like economics will be good or bad.
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tainty of Krusell and Smith (1998). This model is well fit for our purpose because
of its ability to create heterogeneity in the expected future return of capital through
anticipated future aggregate capital. In other words, manipulating agents’ aggregate
forecasting rules of the economy according to their current income level generates
a variation in their anticipation of future return of capital. It also allows us to
investigate general equilibrium implications of the expectation heterogeneity.
In the calibration procedure, we closely follow the Acedański (2017). To solve for the
individual policy rule, we use an Euler-equation iteration on a grid of pre-specified
points (Maliar, Maliar, and Valli (2010)). To solve aggregate law of motion of capital,
we modify the standard Krusell-Smith algorithm (Krusell and Smith (1998)).
Our main finding is that compared to benchmark model in which all agents have
rational expectations, expectation differences between agents produce a substantial
level of inequality in the society, measured by Gini coefficient. As the expectation
differences rise, the level of inequality increases firstly then starts to decrease. This
result is driven by two competing forces in our model: the effect of expectation dif-
ferences on individual policy functions and the general equilibrium level of interest
rate. On the one side, as the level of heterogeneity among agent rises, the spread
in incentive to save between individual’s expands. Agents at the top of the income
distribution, who expect high return on their savings in the future save more and
people at the bottom of income distribution loss their incentive to save. Hence,
wealth inequality is aggravated by level of expectation heterogeneity. On the other
side, as the optimism level of high - income people increase, they save more whereas
pessimistic low-income people can not dissave enough because of the borrowing con-
straint of the incomplete market. This mechanism implies higher aggregate capital
at the general equilibrium, and thus lower interest rate. Hence, even if rich people
become more optimistic relative to the general equilibrium level of interest rate,
their interest rate expectation will decrease because of the deterioration in the gen-
eral equilibrium level of interest rate. As a result, an inverse U-shape relationship
between the Gini coefficient and the level of expectation heterogeneity arises.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the related
literature briefly. Section 3 presents the theoretical model that we studied. Section
4 presents the information regarding calibration exercise. In section 5, the findings
of the study are presented. Section 6 concludes. The computational procedure of
the study is presented in the appendix section in detail.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This study is attached to two areas of the literature. First, it contributes the area
of research that investigates the source of heterogeneity in wealth1. Almost all gen-
eral equilibrium models in this literature are based on Bewley Model in which the
agents are ex ante identical but ex post heterogeneous due to different realization
of shocks. Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1996) initialized the discussion by working
quantitatively on the models with incomplete market and uninsured idiosyncratic
shocks. Although Huggets’s calibration achieves to match US wealth gini consider-
ably, many moments of the wealth distribution especially wealth concentration at
the top of distribution and extreme poverty remains unexplained.
Many solutions to this problem have been developed. Carroll (1998) objectifies
"capitalist spirit", which is a sociological concept proposed by Max Weber, within a
quantitative general equilibrium model. He believes that the wealth enters the utility
function as a luxury good and this in assumption accompanied by an explanation for
why rich people have higher saving rates in the actual data. Krusell and Smith (1998)
formulate a model with heterogeneous time preference which allows the more patient
agents to save more. They reveals that heterogeneous discount factor generates more
realistic variance of the cross-sectional distribution of wealth.
Although many moments of the wealth distribution is well explained by these stud-
ies, they were still not good enough to capture wealth concentration among the
richest households. Another strand of the literature proposes that incorporating
entrepreneurship in the incomplete market framework is crucial to understand this
mysterious observation in actual wealth distribution data (see Quadrini (2009), M.
and Glenn (2004), and Cagetti and Nardi (2005)). The main motivation of this argu-
ment is the pattern that entrepreneurs have higher saving rates among rich people,
which is documented by Quadrini (1999) and Buera (2009). Quadrini (1999) points
out that the key element driving this pattern is costly financial intermediaries which
make interest rate on borrowing more than return of savings and capital imperfec-
1A detailed literature review is presented by Cagetti and De Nardi (2008) and Nardi (2015)
3
tions which motivate agents who have an entrepreneurial idea to save more. His
model produces better results to match with the upper tail of wealth distribution
observed in actual data compared to previous ones.
Furthermore, bequest motive in the form of both accidental and voluntary is consid-
ered as a source of heterogeneity in wealth. (see Huggett (1996)) and Yang (2005)).
While accidental bequest is conceptualized as a possible result of life span risk and
thus, it does not alter the saving behavior of the agents, voluntary bequest motive
impacts saving decisions directly as insurance against labor shock and life span risk
do. Voluntary bequest motive also produces more consistent lifetime saving profiles
with the ones observed in the data. In addition, Nardi (2004) takes into account
inter-generational transition of human capital and del Rio (2015) introduces the
market skills of agents and heterogeneity in labor disutility to capture substantial
heterogeneity in the wealth distribution.
The second area of literature related with our study is on the heterogeneity in
expectations 2. A bulk of this strand of literature has focused on the source of
heterogeneity in expectations about macroeconomic variables, which is documented
by several studies (see Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003), Vissing-Jorgensen (2004),
Dreger and Stadtmann (2008) and, and Gnan, Langthaler, and Valderrama (2011)).
Ball, Gregory Mankiw, and Reis (2005) articulate the systematic errors of individ-
uals’ expectations as a result of infrequently update of information by agents and
posits it as a main source of expectation heterogeneity. On the other hand, Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) consider agents as econometricians who do know the model
but not the parameters of the model. Although there are many studies on the source
of expectation heterogeneity, the research in the potential macroeconomic outcomes
of this heterogeneity remains limited. As far as we know, the only research which
has investigated the role of expectation heterogeneity on the wealth inequality is
written by Acedański (2017). His study focuses on the role of randomly assigned
heterogeneous expectations related to interest rate and the exogenous frequency
of switch between different expectations on the wealth inequality. This study im-
proves this question in the sense of the empirical findings reported by Das, Kuhnen,
and Nagel (2017), a positive relation between agents’ macroeconomic optimism and
their income level. What if the expectation heterogeneity distributed systematically
across the population rather than being random is arguably an important question
to be addressed.
2A detailed literature review is presented by Pfajfar (2013).
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3. MODEL
In this section, we describe our model economy which is a modified version of Krusell
- Smith heterogeneous agents model with uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate
uncertainty. The main sources of heterogeneity are aggregate capital forecasting rule
of agents, which is conditioned on the individual’s current income level, and idiosyn-
cratic income shock which implies variation in individuals’ employment histories.
3.1 Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived many agents. We
assume that the agents have one unit of time endowment, which gives rise to tl
unit of labor input, where l is agent’s labor supply and t represents the employment
status of the agent in period t and it evolves according to two-stage Markov chain.
If he/she is unemployed in period t, t = 0, otherwise t = 1. In the case that the
agent is employed, he/she earns the net wage (1−τt)lwt, where 0≤ τt ≤ 1 is tax rate
and wt is the wage. Unemployed agents receive unemployment benefit, µwt, where
0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 is the unemployment benefit rate. In addition to labor income, agents
receive interest on their capital holding kt, which is equal to (rt−δ)kt, where rt and
δ represent interest rate and depreciation rate respectively. Note that subscript t
denotes time during this study.
3.2 Agents’ Problem
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In this environment, the agents decide how to divide their wealth which is a sum-
mation of labor income and capital income between consumption and saving in each
period. The agent’s problem can be characterized as follows:
max
ct,kt+1
Et
∞∑
h=0
βhu(ct+h) s.t.(3.1)
ct+h+kt+h+1 = (1− δ− rt+h)kt+h+
[
(1− τt+h)lt+h+µ(1− t+h)
]
wt+h(3.2)
kt+h ≥ k, h= 1,2 . . .(3.3)
ct+h ≥ 0, h= 1,2 . . .(3.4)
where c is consumption, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 represents discount factor of the agents, and k
denotes the borrowing constraint. We assume that the utility function of the agents
is constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) with γ representing relative risk aversion
coefficient:
(3.5) u(c) = c
1−γ−1
1−γ
3.3 Production Sector and Government
Production sector consists of a representative firm which has a technology for pro-
ducing single consumption good according to Cobb-Douglas production function.
(3.6) Yt = ztKαt (lLt)1−α
where K and L represent total amount of capital and labor supplied by agents
respectively, z is aggregate productivity shock following two stage Markov chain,
and 0< α < 1 denotes capital share.
Since the firm operates in a competitive environment, the production function im-
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plies that wage and interest rate are the followings:
(3.7) wt(zt,Kt,Lt) = (1−α)zt
(
Kt
lLt
)α
(3.8) rt(zt,Kt,Lt) = (α)zt
(
Kt
lLt
)(1−α)
The government’s role in our model follows the one which is specified by Haan, Judd,
and Juillard (2010) and Acedański (2017). Government balances its budget every
period by collecting taxes, τt on labor in order to finance unemployment benefits,
µ. Thus, the government’s budget constraint can be defined as follows:
(3.9) τtwtlLt = µutwt
where ut represents unemployment rate in period t. This constraint implies that the
government set the tax rate τ in period t, according to following equation:
(3.10) τt =
µut
lLt
3.4 Expectation Heterogeneity
Krusell and Smith (1998) describe the law of motion of capital perceived by agents
with a stochastic process for a finite-dimensional vector of moments of the wealth
distribution. Specifically, they reveal that the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates
at the stationary stochastic equilibrium can be almost perfectly characterized by the
first moment of wealth distribution. As a result, they proposed that the following
log-linear functional form with proper set of parameter P b = {a0,a1, b0, b1} is good
enough to make agents almost fully rational:
(3.11) logKt+1 = a0 +a1 logKt if zt = zg
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(3.12) logKt+1 = b0 + b1 logKt if zt = zb
where zg and zb represent good(boom) or bad(recession) states of the economy. Re-
ducing all moments of wealth distribution to the first moment of wealth distribution
leads consumers facing manageable prediction problem. More specifically Krusell
and Smith (1998) shows that an agent perceiving above simple laws of motion for
aggregate capital makes extremely small mistakes. Briefly, following the mean of the
wealth distribution under above functional form is almost enough to make agents
fully rational.
In order to impose expectation heterogeneity into the model, we assume the same
law of motion of aggregate capital with only one difference - assigning the parameter
set P b = {a0, b0,a1, b1} conditional on agent’s income ranking. Since we assume that
people with higher income are more optimistic about the future return of their
savings, we manipulate the anticipated future interest rate, r′ with a function Φ(i) :
I→ [−m,m], where i ∈ I represents the income ranking of the agent, m ∈R++ and
Φ′(i)≥ 0. We characterize interest rate expectation of an agent who is at the income
ranking i, r′i as the following:
(3.13) r′i = (1 + Φ(i))r′b
where r′b is the anticipated future interest rate in the case that every agent has
the rational expectation. To be more precise, we set the interest rate produced
by a model without any heterogeneity of expectation as an anchor, and define the
heterogeneous expectation of future interest rate relative to this anchor.
Implied expected aggregate capital stock is derived from equation 3.11 and 3.12. It
is as the followings:
(3.14) log(Kb) =
a0
1−a1 if z = zg
(3.15) log(Kb) =
b0
1− b1 if z = zb
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The following formula is derived by using equation 3.8 and equation 3.13
(3.16) Ki =Kb/(1 + Φ(i))
1
α−1 ∀i ∈ I
Given a0,a1, b0, b1 and Φ(i) implies different aggregate capital Ki value for each
income group i, and similar to 3.14 and 3.15.
(3.17) log(Ki) =
a0i
1−a1i if z = zg
(3.18) log(Ki) =
b0i
1− b1i if z = zb
Thereby, the set of parameter P = {a0i, b0i,a1i, b1i,∀i ∈ I} is set in order to satisfy
3.17 and 3.18. As a result, the forecasting rule of aggregate capital turns out to be
following equations whose the parameters are conditional of income ranking of the
agent:
(3.19) logKi,t+1 = a0i+a1i logKi,t if zt = zg
(3.20) logKi,t+1 = b0i+ bi1logKi,t if zt = zb
3.5 Recursive Formulation
In the following notation, the time subscripts are omitted and the next period’s
variables are denoted with primes. The recursive decision problem of the agents can
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be characterized as follows:
v(k,K,,z) = max
c,k′
{u(c) +βEv(k′,K ′, ′, z′)} s.t(3.21)
k′+ c= (1− δ− r)k+ [(1− τ)l+µ(1− )]w(3.22)
logK ′ = a0i+a1i logK if z = zg(3.23)
logK ′ = b0i+ bi1logK if z = zb(3.24)
k′,k ≥ k(3.25)
where v denotes value function, and subscript i denotes the current income group
of the agent.
Note that expectation heterogeneity is imposed to model by conditioning parameters
of law of motion of aggregate capital on agent’s current income and it is neither
state variable nor a stochastic process1. This method has some implications which
are worth to be discussed. Firstly, agents are not aware that their optimism and
pessimism about market prices are related to their current income level. Thus, a high
- income optimist agent may turns out to be a pessimist agent in the next period if
her income is adequately deteriorated by a negative employment shock. At the first
glance, this radical set up may be seen as unrealistic. However, Das et al. (2017)
employ a panel sub-sample of their data set and show that the relation between
income and optimism remains to be statistically significant, implying that optimism
may change even within an agent’s life depending on her income level. In addition,
considering expectation heterogeneity as a state variable of the problem may lead
complications in our framework since it is dependent to income which is partly
determined by agents via saving decisions. In this case, expectation heterogeneity
would be a tool which can be manipulated by agents in order to increase individual
welfare rather than being a behavioral anomaly that we want to investigate.
The quantitative solution method of our model is described in the Appendix in
detail. In brief, given state variables and expectation parameters we discussed above,
each agent solves its own problem by deciding individual asset holding level. All
agents’ decisions generate a specific level of aggregate capital. We iterate expectation
parameters until the model reaches its stationary equilibrium in terms of aggregate
capital.
1In the next section, we will elaborate how the expectation heterogeneity parameter is constructed.
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4. CALIBRATION PROCEDURE
In this section, we explain how we choose parameter values of the model. In addition,
we elaborate the method of specifying the function Φ(i) which decides the level of
expectation heterogeneity among agents.
The parameters are set using a model period of one quarter. The calibration pro-
cedure closely follows the work of Krusell and Smith (1998). The discount factor β
equals to 0.99. Utility parameter γ converges to 1, which lead CRRA utility function
collapses the logarithmic utility, i.e, u(c) = log(c). We use capital share α of 0.36 and
depreciation rate δ of 0.025. The time endowment l is 0.31. We set the transition
matrix of the Markov chain for idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks following the es-
timate of Krusell and Smith (1998). Transition probabilities are presented in Table
4.1. Aggregate shock values, zg and zb is set to 1.01 and 0.99, respectively in order
to match aggregate fluctuations in the US economy. The calibration parameters are
summarized in Table 4.2.
Table 4.1 Transition Probabilities
R - U R - E B - U B - E
R - U 0.525 0.35 0.03125 0.09375
R - E 0.03889 0.83611 0.00208 0.12292
B - U 0.9375 0.03125 0.29167 0.58333
B - E 0.00912 0.11589 0.02431 0.85069
R and B represent recession and boom states of the economy, respectively. U and E
denote being unemployed and employed, respectively. The table presents transition
probabilities from period t to period t+1.
We split the population into four groups in each period according to their current
income, which implies i ∈ {1,2,3,4}. If i = 1 the agents at the bottom 25% of the
current income distribution. i = 2 and i = 3 implies that the agent’s income is be-
tween 26 - 50 and 51 - 75 percentiles, respectively. Finally, If i = 4, the agents at
top 25% of the income distribution. We constraint the number of income group
as four because of the trade of between the explanatory power of the model and
11
Table 4.2 Calibration Parameters
Parameter Description Value
α capital share 0.36
β discount parameter 0.99
δ depreciation rate 0.025
l time endowment 0.31
zg aggregate shock in a boom 1.01
zb aggregate shock in a recession 0.99
µ unemployment replacement rate 0.15
k debt limit -4
kmin lower bound of individual capital holding -4
kmax lower bound of individual capital holding 200
Kmin lower bound of aggregate capital level 8
Kmax lower bound of aggregate capital level 16
nk number of grid points on k 200
nK number of grid points on K 17
η1,η2 tolerance parameters 10−8, 10−3
pi update parameter 0.5
ab0,a
b
1 benchmark aggregate law of motion coefficients 0.0786, 0.9660
bb0, b
b
1 0.0898, 0.9636
computational work. On the one side, a smaller number of groups prevents us from
evaluating general equilibrium, income mobility, and individual policy rule effects
simultaneously since the transition of agents between income groups is altered con-
siderably as the number of groups decreases. On the other side, a higher number of
groups requires much more computational power. However, we control the model
results for higher number of groups, as well. It is observed that although the numer-
ical results change substantially, the general patterns that we interpreted in Section
3 remained unchanged.
Following function depending on expectation heterogeneity function that we describe
in previous section is defined for the sake of simplicity:
(4.1) Ψ(i) = 1
(1 + Φ(i))
1
α−1
The following form is assigned to the function Ψ(i)1:
1see Figure 4.1 in order to understand what the functional form in equation 4.2 implies in terms of future
interest rate expectations of the heterogeneous groups.
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Ψ(i) =

(1 + ∆) i= 1
(1 + ∆/2) i= 2
(1−∆/2) i= 3
(1−∆) i= 4
(4.2)
Figure 4.1 Design of Heterogeneity
This figure illustrates the method of imposing heterogeneity to expected interest
rate for ∆ = 0.1 and K = 13. The blue line shows expectation bias imposed by
dispersion parameter where zero at y-axes means there is no bias. The red line
represents anticipated future interest rates by income ranking, which is produced by
related biases shown with blue line.
Various values of ∆ are considered to evaluate the model2. It is important to re-
state that the model is far from making quantitative implication because of the lack
of information on the functional form of the expectation heterogeneity conditional
on income. Rather, a general parametrization is used in order to investigate theo-
retically how expectation heterogeneity depending on socioeconomic status and its
magnitude affects wealth inequality. Note that the higher ∆, the more optimistic
people at the top of income distribution and the more pessimistic people at the
bottom of income distribution. At the rest of the paper, we may use poorest, poor,
rich and richest groups to refer the agents whose income rankings are equal to i= 1,
i= 2, i= 3, and i= 4 respectively for the sake of fluency.
2Note that ∆ = 0 means the model is the same with the benchmark model which there is no expectation
heterogeneity. The other values of ∆ as the followings: 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.035, 0.055, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5,
0.8. Among them, 0.02 is close to the standard deviation of the time series of aggregate capital produced
by benchmark model with no heterogeneous expectations and 0.055 is equal to the standard deviation of
the time series of aggregate capital estimated from data (Acedański 2017).
13
5. RESULTS
In Table 5.1, several moments of wealth distribution at the equilibrium are presented
for different dispersion parameter, ∆ values. The wealth inequality measured by
Gini coefficient, at the second row of the table, is determined by two opposing
forces: The amount of expectation bias and general equilibrium effect. The amount
of expectation bias is characterized by ∆ as we discussed in Section 2.4. As ∆
increases, level of heterogeneity towards the expectation on future interest rate rises.
This exacerbates the inequality resulting from different employment histories since
agents who have more favorable employment history are more likely to be optimistic
while agents who have got negative shocks are more likely to be pessimistic. Hence,
higher value of ∆ or the more distance between agents’ anticipated future return of
their savings implies higher level of wealth inequality since agents’ saving decisions
vary with anticipated future return of their savings.
The second mechanism which drives the level of wealth inequality can be called gen-
eral equilibrium effect. As we discussed in section 2.4, the expectation heterogeneity
on aggregate capital is formed around general equilibrium level of aggregate capital.
As an example, in the case that ∆ = 0.005, richest people in the economy expect
0.005 less capital than general equilibrium level of aggregate capital while poorest
people in the economy expect 0.005 more capital than general equilibrium level of ag-
gregate capital. The first column of the Table 5.1 shows that the average aggregate
capital level at the general equilibrium rises with dispersion parameter, implying
that as the expectation difference among income groups increases, the equilibrium
level of expected interest rate decreases. This relation arises as a result of incomplete
market structure of our model economy. To be more specific, general equilibrium
interest rate decreases with ∆ because extra savings of rich people stemming from
their over optimism on future returns cannot be absorbed by poor people who are
willing to borrow since total amount of debt stock of each agent is not allowed to
exceed borrowing constraint, k. Thus, higher values of ∆ implies less incentive to
save for all agents compared to lower values of ∆. In other words, increase in aver-
age aggregate capital exerts downward pressure on wealth inequality by providing a
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Table 5.1 Results (Main Model)
∆: 0 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.035 0.055 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8
Av. K 10.97 11.00 11.04 11.22 11.19 11.31 11.58 12.16 12.68 13.17 13.72 15.42
Gini 0.545 0.728 0.779 0.806 0.812 0.816 0.820 0.821 0.815 0.798 0.779 0.684
Top 1 8.9 5.28 5.45 5.11 5.32 5.24 5.15 5.03 4.85 4.52 4.13 3.23
Top 10 35.9 41.8 45.6 46.8 48.3 48.6 48.8 48.5 47.2 44.15 40.3 31.56
Neg. 6.5 34.6 47.5 55.6 61.2 65.6 71.1 73.8 67.0 51.2 49.2 50
The results are obtained from a simulation with 10000 agents and 35000 periods.
The first 5000 periods are treated as a burn in the sample. ’Av. K’ means average
aggregate capital in the economy. ’Gini’ means gini coefficient of the wealth distri-
bution. ’Top 1’ and ’Top 10’ represents the total share of wealth held by wealthiest
1 % and 10 % of the population. ’Neg.’ is the fraction of population with negative
wealth.
disincentive for the top earners. The forth row of the Table 5.1 presents the average
share of total wealth held by the wealthiest 10 % of the populations. It reveals that
higher optimism does not imply higher share of wealth for top earners.
Under these two competing effects of level of expectation heterogeneity on income
inequality, the Gini coefficient peaks its maximum value when ∆ = 0.2 and then
starts to decrease. A sufficiently large value of ∆ allows the general equilibrium ef-
fects to dominate the effects of individual decision rules, wherein the Gini coefficient
stops increasing. As a result, an inverse U-shape relation between inequality and
level of heterogeneity parameter arises (see Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.2 illustrates the wealth distribution in the model under various ∆ values.
A concentration around borrowing constraint is observed even for very small ex-
pectation differences. As the expectation difference rise, wealth holding level of
heterogeneous groups diverge more from each other. This deteriorates the income
mobility between heterogeneous groups, which exacerbates the divergence implied
by different future interest rate expectations. To be more precise, low-income level
agents have lower saving rate because of the lower level of interest rate expectation
while high-income agents have a tendency to save more due to more optimist ex-
pectations toward future interest rates. Thus, they have realized different wealth
holdings. However, the total income, which determines the expectation of agents
have a second component, labor income. Idiosyncratic unemployment shocks pro-
duced by a stochastic process generates labor income for each agent. Therefore, if a
negative shock hits optimistic agent and positive shock hits pessimistic agent, they
can change their socioeconomic status determined by the summation of labor income
and capital income in the case that their capital holdings are not so much different.
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Figure 5.1 Moments of Wealth Distribution and Level of Expectation Heterogeneity
The relationship between several wealth distribution moments and level of hetero-
geneity represented by ∆ on the x-axis. The blue line is gini coefficient with the
values on the left y-axis. Red line and the dashed red line represent fraction of agents
with negative wealth and share of total wealth held by richest 10 %, respectively.
Thus, continuous transitions between groups alleviate the wealth inequality stem-
ming from different saving rate decisions. When the expectation heterogeneity is
large enough, the wealth holdings of income groups implied by their expectations
cluster far from each other as the panel B of figure 4.2 illustrates. Thus, Idiosyncratic
shocks turn out to be inadequate to create income mobility between heterogeneous
groups. The model with ∆ = 0.005 produces on average 26 transition between rich
group to richest groups each period, which is approximately equal to 1 percent of
the group population. However, almost zero income mobility between these groups
is produced by the model with ∆ = 0.02.
5.1 Expectation on Future Wage
It is possible to notice that agents’ expectation bias towards aggregate capital gen-
erates expectation heterogeneity on not only anticipated future interest rates but
also future wages. Put differently, our model implies that level of optimism about
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Figure 5.2 Wealth Distribution
Wealth distributions for ∆ = 0.05, ∆ = 0.02, ∆ = 0.4, and ∆ = 0.8, are presented
in this figure. Number of agents and wealth holding are on the y-axis and x-axis,
respectively.
future wages decreases with income level of agents. However, Das, Kuhnen, and
Nagel (2017) also reveal that having a higher income rank is the significant predic-
tor of the level of optimism in the expectation on employment rate. It is possible
to consider that this pattern about labor market condition might be applicable for
expected wage rates, even if it is not directly measured by Das, Kuhnen, and Nagel
(2017). It would be contradictory with the implications of our model. Therefore, we
simulate the model by excluding the heterogeneity on anticipated future wage. The
results are presented in Table 5.2. Fortunately, many of the patterns that we dis-
cussed above are not altered considerably. Based on Figure 5.3, the inverse U-shape
relation between inequality and level of heterogeneity parameter, ∆ is preserved
when we isolate our model from expectation heterogeneity on future wage rates.
Excluding this heterogeneity generates a level effect on the relation between gini co-
efficient and ∆. To be more specific, the higher inequality in our main specification
is a result of precautionary saving mechanism, in which the richer agents have a
tendency to save more in order to insure themselves against lower anticipated future
wage rates. Similarly, higher future wage rate anticipated by poorer agents implies
lower saving rate for them. Excluding anticipated wage heterogeneity improves the
wealth inequality by eliminating this mechanism.
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Table 5.2 Results (Expectation on Future Wage)
∆: 0 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.035 0.055 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8
Av. K 10.97 10.99 10.99 11.02 11.04 11.07 11.15 11.31 11.46 11.60 11.76 12.09
Gini 0.545 0.621 0.699 0.762 0.792 0.805 0.814 0.814 0.796 0.766 0.718 0.645
Top 1% 8.9 4.7 5.2 5.5 5.6 5.56 5.4 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.6 2.9
Top 10% 35.9 36.2 40.1 44.6 47.2 48.4 49.0 47.8 43.8 39.6 34.6 27.8
Neg. 6.5 18.1 28.5 41.8 50.4 55.5 63.8 63.9 52.4 50.2 49.9 50
The results are obtained from a simulation with 10000 agents and 35000 periods.
The first 5000 periods are treated as a burn in the sample. ’Av. K’ means average
aggregate capital in the economy. ’Gini’ means gini coefficient of the wealth distri-
bution. ’Top 1’ and ’Top 10’ represents the total share of wealth held by wealthiest
1 % and 10 % of the population. ’Neg.’ is the fraction of population with negative
wealth.
5.2 Role of Conditioning on Income
Acedański (2017) investigates the role of expectation heterogeneity on wealth in-
equality without conditioning the heterogeneity on income. His study focuses on
the role of randomly assigned heterogeneous expectation and the exogenous fre-
quency of switch between different expectations on the wealth inequality. However,
our model produces endogenous transition between heterogeneous groups by assign-
ing the expectation bias to each agent according to his/her income level in every
period. In order to understand how this set up drives the wealth inequality among
agents, we compare our main results reported in Table 5.1 and the results of a mod-
ified model which transition between heterogeneous groups is assigned randomly,
as Acedański (2017) reports. Table 5.3 presents the comparison, which columns
with ’M’ and ’RT’ show the results of the main model and results with random
transition, respectively. The number of transition between heterogeneous groups
and average aggregate capital generated by main model is imposed to the random
transition model, as well. In other words, the only differences between main and
random transition model is the functions which determine the expectation bias of
each agent.
For each ∆ value, our model generates at least 20 % higher gini coefficient than
random transition model does. It exhibits that a substantial part of the inequality
produced by our main model derives from the conditioning expectation heterogeneity
towards anticipated future return of saving on income. Random transition structure
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Figure 5.3 Gini Coefficients with and without Wage Expectation Heterogeneity
A comparison between gini coefficients of the models with and without anticipated
future wage heterogeneity.
Table 5.3 Results (Role of Conditioning on Income)
∆: 0 0.005 M 0.005 RT 0.02 M 0.02 RT 0.2 M 0.2 RT
Average Capital 10.97 11.00 11.00 11.22 11.22 12.16 12.16
Gini Coefficient 0.545 0.728 0.571 0.806 0.641 0.821 59.6
Top 1% Wealth 8.9 5.28 7.96 5.11 5.04 5.03 6.46
Top 10% Wealth 35.9 41.8 30.21 46.8 46.1 48.5 43.22
Negative Wealth 6.5 34.6 17.42 55.6 47.1 73.8 50
The comparison between results of the main model and results of the model with
random transition. ’M’ and ’RT’ represents the main model and random transition
model, respectively.
compensates a part of inequality resulting from idiosyncratic employment shocks by
switching agents’ groups randomly. In other words, an agent with bad employment
history may be optimistic and, thereby he/she decides to allocate higher resource
for saving in order to earn more marginal benefit from higher interest rate. Thus,
random transition model also generates lower share of top 10% income and lower
fraction of population with negative wealth than our model does.
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the effect of heterogeneity in expectation towards future in-
terest rates on the wealth inequality. The aim of the research is investigating this
effect theoretically rather than making quantitative statements which requires more
structured micro foundations about the functional form and the magnitude of expec-
tation heterogeneity. The main finding of this paper is an inverse U shape relation
between the level of expectation heterogeneity and the wealth inequality measured
by gini coefficient. This pattern arises as a result of individual decisions under biased
expectations and general equilibrium effect. In addition, income mobility between
heterogeneous groups is a significant determinant of inequality in our model set up.
While most research has focused on the empirical validation or rationalization of
the expectations’ heterogeneity, less attention has been given to an examination of
its consequences. This study intends to fill this gap by studying the role of het-
erogeneous expectations conditioned on income as Das, Kuhnen, and Nagel (2017)
documents in shaping the distribution of wealth in the incomplete markets model
with uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate uncertainty of Krusell and Smith
(1998) .
Many questions which may be arguably important to be addressed have remained
unanswered such as how is the wealth distribution determined under other forms of
expectation heterogeneity?, how does a risky asset motive accompanied by expecta-
tion heterogeneity towards return on saving alter the wealth inequality?, and what
would be the consequences if agents are allowed to make entrepreneurial choices with
their biased expectations? Advancements in the empirical studies which document
the heterogeneity in expectation conditioned by income more accurately may help
to answer these questions in a comprehensive way.
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APPENDIX
Individual Decision Rule
This study closely follows the study of Maliar, Maliar, and Valli (2010) in order to
solve individual policy function. As shown in the cited study, the Euler equation is
the following:
k′ =
(
1− µu
lL
)
wl+µw(1− ) + (1− δ+ r)k
−
Λ +βE
 1− δ+ r′((
1− µu′
lL′
)
w′l′+µw′(1− ′) + (1− δ+ r′)k′−k′′
)γ


−1/γ(6.1)
where Λ is lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint and k′′ refers two period
ahead policy function.
Equation 6.1 is derived from euler equation of recursive problem of the agents (see
section 3.5) by eliminating current and future consumption using budget constraint
and Kuhn - Tucker conditions. Lagrange multiplier and policy function are defined
as a function of current states of the economy, k,,K,z, i.e Λ = Λ(k,,K,z) and
k′ = k′(k,,K,z). We define the individual wealth holding k, and level of aggregate
capital, K on the intervals [kmin,kmax] and [Kmin,Kmax], and dicretize these
intervals with nk and nK number of points respectively to construct a grid of points
for (k,,K,z). Euler equation is solved on this grid using the following iterative
procedure:
Step I: Set the initial policy function at k′0(k,,K,z) = 0.9k for all
k,,K,z values.
Step II: Using the law of motion of capital compute the future
prices, r′ and w′. Set lagrange multiplier Λ = 0. Calculate k′′i =
23
k′i(k′i(k,,K,z), ,K,z). Since the values k′i(k,,K,z) may not overlap
with grid points on k, use spline interpolation in order to decide un-
matched values.
Step III: Given values of future prices, lagrange multiplier, policy func-
tion and two period ahead policy function, calculate the r.h.s value of
equation 6.1, k′i+1 by using the transition probabilities stated in Table
??.
Step IV: Set each point for which k′i+1(k,,K,z) does not belong
[kmin,kmax] equal to the closest boundary values.
Step V: If the distance between k′i and k′i+1 is less than a tolerance
level, η1 end up the process and consider k′i+1 as true policy function.
Otherwise, update the k′i+1 = pik′i+ (1−pi)k′i+1 and return to step II.
Aggregate Law of Motion of Capital
This section describes the procedure which calculates aggregate law of motion
of the economy. To be more precise, we calibrate the set of parameters P =
{a0i, b0i,a1i, b1i,∀i ∈ I} (see Section ??) by using a modified version of Krusell -
Smith algorithm ((Krusell and Smith 1998)). The procedure can be summarized as
follows:
Step I: Fix the initial values of coefficients to the benchmark values (
see Table 4.2), i.e a0 = ab0, a1 = ab1, b0 = bb0, and b1 = bb1.
Step II: Generate T period length aggregate shock and for each of
the N agents, generate T period of idiosyncratic shock. Fix the initial
distribution of capital across N heterogeneous agents.
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Step III: Define each income groups’ coefficients for aggregate law of
motion as the following1:
(6.2) a0i = a0 + Ψ(i)
(6.3) b0i = b0 + Ψ(i)
(6.4) a1i = a1
(6.5) b1i = b0
Step VI: Given set of parameters P = {a0i, b0i,a1i, b1i,∀i ∈ I}, calculate
anticipated future prices r′i and w′i for each i using equations (3.17),
(3.18), (3.7), and (3.8).
Step V: Given anticipated future interest rate and future wage, find the
individual decision rules for each group of people using the procedure
described in previous section.
Step V: Simulate the economy T period forward by using individual
policy rules of each agent. In each period, calculate aggregate level of
capital, Kt.
Step VI: Regress Kt+1 on Kt with the functional forms of equations
(3.11) and (3.12). Derive the coefficients a˜0, a˜1, b˜0, b˜1.
Step VI: Ifmax
{
| a01−a1 −
a˜0
1−a˜1 |, |
b0
1−b1 −
b˜0
1−b˜1
|
}
<η2, finish the procedure
and take set of parameters P as true for the model, otherwise update
1Adjusting expectations only via intercept coefficients is not problematic ((Acedański 2017)). This part will
be explained more detail.
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the initial values a0,a1, b0, b1 as the following:
a0 = pia˜0 + (1−pi)a0(6.6)
a1 = pia˜1 + (1−pi)a1(6.7)
b0 = pib˜0 + (1−pi)b0(6.8)
b1 = pib˜1 + (1−pi)b1(6.9)
and return to step III.
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